Martin Econometrics: Econometría y Aplicaciones

1. En algún lugar cerca de segundo y tercer año de la carrera de economía, a uno le enseñan acerca de la información asimétrica. El concepto parece muy claro, el cual significa el hecho de que los agentes económicos no tienen la misma cantidad de información antes de cualquier transacción. Por lo tanto, los incentivos no se mantienen correctamente en un sistema de información completa y la negociación (es decir, el regateo) se distorsiona. 2. Los modelos microeconómicos básicos suponen que los agentes tienen información completa, especialmente a través de los precios y sus determinantes, por ejemplo, la calidad de las mercancías, el período de depreciación, etc. Este supuesto inhibe la posibilidad de discutir si los mercados son eficientes, en la asignación de precios. Sin embargo, uno debe saber que esta hipótesis es falsa, al menos desde un enfoque cualitativo (1). 3. De hecho, la información no es una dicotomía (información completa vs No hay datos en absoluto), en realidad es una c

1. Somewhere near second and third year of economic studies, one is told about Asymmetric Information. The concept looks very clear, which stands for the fact that economic agents don't hold the same amount of information before any transaction. Thus, their incentives are not properly sustained on a complete information scheme and the negotiation (i.e. bargaining) will be distorted.  2. Basic microeconomic models assume that agents have complete information, specially over price and its determinants, for instance, the quality of the goods, the depreciation period and so on. This assumption inhibits the possibility to discuss if the markets are efficient while assigning prices. Nevertheless, one should know that assumption is false, at least from a qualitative approach (1) .  3. In fact, information is not a dichotomy (complete information/no information at all), it's actually a quantitative question, a variable not a parameter, i.e. poor information, medium information, lots of

ABSTRACT: "Herndon, Ash and Pollin replicate Reinhart and Rogoff and find that coding errors, selective exclusion of available data, and unconventional weighting of summary statistics lead to serious errors that inaccurately represent the relationship between public debt and GDP growth among 20 advanced economies in the post-war period. They find that when properly calculated, the average real GDP growth rate for countries carrying a public-debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90 percent is actually 2.2 percent, not -0:1 percent as published in Reinhart and Rogo ff. That is, contrary to RR, average GDP growth at public debt/GDP ratios over 90 percent is not dramatically different than when debt/GDP ratios are lower. The authors also show how the relationship between public debt and GDP growth varies significantly by time period and country. Overall, the evidence we review contradicts Reinhart and Rogoff 's claim to have identified an important stylized fact, that public debt loads gre

ABSTRACT: "The standard approach to policy-making and advice in economics implicitly or explicitly ignores politics and political economy, and maintains that if possible, any market failure should be rapidly removed. This essay explains why this conclusion may be incorrect; because it ignores politics, this approach is oblivious to the impact of the removal of market failures on future political equilibria and economic efficiency, which can be deleterious. We first outline a simple framework for the study of the impact of current economic policies on future political equilibria— and indirectly on future economic outcomes. We then illustrate the mechanisms through which such impacts might operate using a series of examples. The main message is that sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy and should factor in its influence on future political equilibria." ( http://papers.nber.org/papers/w18921#fromrss ) COMMENTS: This controversial paper